ABSTRACT Confidentiality, integrity, and availability constitute the triad of cybersecurity. Confidentiality is the property of invisibility against unauthorized parties. Integrity is protecting data from being altered or falsified by unauthorized parties, and availability is the accessibility of data to legitimate parties whenever they need it. However, in quantum cryptography, confidentiality is of central interest, while the latter two are often overlooked. In contrast, the Y00 protocol has an affinity for the conventional optical infrastructure. Therefore, its availability is the same as that of the current optical network. Moreover, the previous work showed that the quaternary Y00 protocol could prevent message falsification to satisfy integrity. This paper proposes a new implementation that uses a quantum mask size reduced to 4 levels from 24 levels that was required in the previous work. This smaller mask is sufficient to prevent the attacker's falsified messages in the middle of the communication line at will, even if she knows the full message. Therefore, the attacker fails to falsify the message with a probability of almost 100% per byte.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting messages by quantum cryptography against eavesdropping is a frequently discussed topic. Such a function is called confidentiality, while the two other major requirements in cybersecurity are integrity and availability [1] , [2] . Integrity is protecting data from being altered by unauthorized parties. Availability is a property by which the data is accessible to legitimate users when they need. In quantum cryptography, confidentiality has been frequently discussed, while integrity is rarely discussed [3] - [5] .
In 2013, a message falsification by an attacker in the middle of the communication line based on a known-plaintext attack (KPA) on the Y00 quantum stream cipher was discussed [3] . This work showed that an existing binary Y00 protocol could not have integrity, while its confidentiality is considerably high. This is because flipping the set of coherent states in the binary Y00 protocol corresponds to flipping the plaintext bit; hence, the attacker can alter the message easily when KPA is launched. Therefore, a quaternary Y00 protocol was proposed in which an attacker cannot alter the message at will because the plaintext mapping was randomized, and the attacker needed to know the appropriate signal shift to alter the message [3] . Moreover, the previously proposed protocol
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does not require new cryptographic primitives, such as quantum digital signatures [5] . Conventional cryptographic primitives were sufficient because these primitives will be hidden in quantum noise. However, the proposed concept required all permutations of two-bit plaintexts; hence, the required number of signal levels hidden in quantum noise had to be more than 4! = 24, which is rather large for a quantum mask. To cover the 24 signal levels, the previous protocol required classical-noise randomization, such as deliberate signal randomization [6] .
This paper proposes an easier implementation of the message-falsification prevention function on quaternary Y00 systems to overcome the above problem by removing the redundant rotational symmetry with the help of overlapselection-keying (OSK); its original use is to scramble the binary plaintext by modulo-two addition of a pseudorandom number generated with another symmetric key [6] , [7] . Hence, only four signal levels are required to be hidden in quantum noise.
II. PRINCIPLES OF STANDARD BINARY Y00 PROTOCOL
This section briefly explains how Y00 systems hide messages from the attacker in quantum noise. The Y00 protocol was originally invented by Yuen in 2000 [8] - [12] . There are several variations of this protocol, such as phase-shift-keying (PSK) Y00 [8] - [12] , intensity-shiftkeying (ISK) Y00 [13] - [19] , and quadrature-amplitudemodulation (QAM) Y00 [20] - [22] ; however, all Y00 systems have common principles.
A. PRINCIPLE OF BINARY Y00 PROTOCOL
To start the Y00 protocol, legitimate users Alice and Bob must share a secret key k. Then, they expand k into a key stream s by the same PRNGs equipped in both a transmitter and a receiver. Then, s is chopped every (log 2 M ) bit to form M -ary string s(t) at time slot t. A message bit x(t) is encoded into a coherent state |α[m(t)] using s(t) as
is a projection from (log 2 M )-bit string s(t) to Map[s(t)] {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , M − 1}. Therefore, the message bit x(t) {0, 1} corresponds to a set of quantum states
Bob's receiver sets an optimal threshold based on known Map[s(t)] generated common k and PRNG to discriminate the set of quantum states. Therefore, he can decode x(t). On the other hand, Eve must discriminate 2M -ary signals hidden in overlapping quantum noise. Therefore, she does not know whether Map[s(t)] is even or odd. Hence, she cannot decode x(t).
B. OVERLAP-SELECTION-KEYING
When Eve launches a KPA, the number of the hidden signal levels in quantum noise effectively halves; hence, it might help Eve to guess k.
To avoid the situation, OSK was proposed. An additional PRNG with a key k is equipped in both the transmitter and receiver to scramble the plaintext x(t) by x(t) generated by the PRNG as [6] , [7] .
Scrambling x(t) by x(t), OSK turns Eve's KPA into a ciphertext-only attack (COA) unless x(t) is known to Eve. Another important randomization is ''irregular mapping'' [6] , [23] . This was proposed as a countermeasure to the fast correlation attack [24] , [25] on the Y00 protocol, which is often applied to conventional stream ciphers. In the attack, Eve pays attention to bits in s(t), which are not covered sufficiently by quantum noise, then recovers the original s, hence k as well. To make the Y00 protocol immune to the attack, a well-designed Irregular Mapping Map[s(t)] is required so that quantum noise equally covers each bit of s(t).
III. PREVIOUS QUATERNARY Y00 WITH MESSAGE INTEGRITY
This section describes how Eve falsifies the messages in binary Y00 systems and quaternary Y00 systems prevent.
A. MESSAGE FALSIFICATION BY KNOWN PLAINTEXT
Even though Eve cannot guess the shared key k as well as k, she can still alter the messages under KPA in the case of binary Y00 systems, because flipping x(t) corresponds to flipping the set of coherent states {|α[m(t)] , |α[m(t) + M ]}. Binary ISK Y00 systems have a weak functionality of message-falsification prevention. However, it is insufficient to protect messages [3] .
The situation will be the same if the signal level of a quaternary Y00 system is
Here, q(t), q(t) {00, 01, 10, 11} in two-bit plaintext and OSK scrambling, respectively. Alice encodes her q(t) into a coherent state {|α[m(t) + nM ] |n = 0, 1, 2, 3}, then Bob decodes it by thresholds based on the common Map[s(t)]. Clearly, covering four signal levels by quantum noise is enough to satisfy confidentiality. However, Eve still can alter the message as follows.
Eve already knows q(t).

She observes |α[m(t)] as |α [m(t) + m Noise ] . 3. To alter q(t) into q E (t), she resends a coherent state to Bob with m(t) + m Noise + M [q E (t) -q(t) mod 4]. 4. Bob decodes the coherent state from Eve, obtaining
q E (t). Therefore, a simple implementation of a quaternary Y00 system will not protect the message from falsifications.
B. QUATERNARY Y00 SYSTEM PROPOSED IN PREVIOUS WORK
To overcome the problem, following quaternary Y00 systems were proposed [3] by replacing (1) with
LT(Q, R) in (4) is a look-up table (LT) given in TABLE 1. Bob's task is, again, to discriminate a set of four coherent states {|α[m(t) + nM ] |n = 0, 1, 2, 3} by thresholds based on the common Map[s(t)] to decode q(t). If quantum noise covers more than 24 signal levels sufficiently, Eve makes mistakes in falsifying q(t) at will because she never knows the correct signal shift to alter q(t) without knowing Map[s(t)]. Hence, she fails in altering q(t) with a probability of approximately 2/3. The situation is illustrated in FIGURE 1.
As described above, the previous work realized messagefalsification prevention on quaternary Y00 systems. However, the LT straightforwardly consisted of all permutations of four levels as given in TABLE 1, causing difficulty in covering the 24 signal levels by quantum noise. For instance, in quaternary ISK (QISK) Y00 systems, the intensity gap between the signal levels must be less than 200 photons [3] . (4) with (5) and (6).
IV. MESSAGE-FALSIFICATION PREVENTION BY OSK
This section proposes a reduced LT using OSK and describes its ease of implementation.
A. SMALLER LOOK-UP TABLE WITHOUT OSK
Replacing (5) with (7) and (6) with (8) solves the problem described in Sec. III. B, since it removes redundant rotational symmetry from TABLE 1, hence TABLE 2 is obtained.
Here, the role of Q is choosing the row of TABLE 2, giving rotational symmetry to the LT. The role of R is choosing the columns of the remaining permutations. (4) with (7) and (8) .
However, Sec. V will show that (7) and (8) are not sufficient when the signal distance is large.
B. USE OF OSK AGAINST MESSAGE FALSIFICATION
With OSK, (8) is replaced by
Here, q(t) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is supplied from a PRNG for OSK. To generate q(t), consider an output r(t) from PRNG for OSK uniformly distributed in 0 ≤ r(t) < 1; then q(t) := floor[6r(t)] for LT(Q, R) in TABLE 2. This is because both q(t) and Map [s(t)] in (7) provide rotational symmetry in TABLE 1. The schematic view is illustrated in FIGURE 2. Note that the least masking by the quantum noise is only 4 to cover the rotational symmetry represented by (7) even though the table size is reduced to 6 columns from 24 columns. The remaining six columns are overlapping in the single signal level thanks to (9) . Therefore, indeed, (9) scrambles q(t) similarly to the original use of OSK in (2).
V. THEORETICAL AND NUMERICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
This section describes numerical performance analyses under Eve's certain attack scenario. For simplicity, time slot parameter t is omitted from this section.
A. ATTACK SCENARIO
To generate a meaningful false message, Eve's possible attack scenario is as follows, although there could be an optimal strategy:
1. Eve already knows q. 
B. PREVIOUS QUATERNARY ISK Y00 PROTOCOL
Eve receives Alice's coherent state by ideal direct detection, not heterodyne detection because ideal direct detection makes the quantum mask smaller [26] in ISK Y00 systems. In ideal direct detection, the detected photon number n E has a Poisson distribution given as
Here, m is given by (4) 
Here, S cen is the average intensity of the QISK Y00 protocol. Eve chooses Map[s E ] probabilistically by
Here, from (11), Pr(n E | Map[s E ], q) = Pr(n E | S A ) was applied to (14) . Bob sets thresholds to decode q from an observed signal as follows, close to the optimal thresholds by order of M S/(8S) from Bayes' criterion [27] ;
Suppose Bob detects n B by direct detection after Eve sent S E = S(q E , Map[s E ]) through a channel with its loss η so that Bob receives the signals as ones from Alice. Then, Bob's probability of obtaining q E is
Here,
In (17), Bob's probability of detecting photon number n B is
From the viewpoint of Alice and Bob, Eve's success probability conditioned on Map[s] is given by
To perform numerical simulations, Poisson distributions are approximated by normal distributions for large S as
To simulate the proposed implementation in this study, (8) is replace with (9), as well as (11), (14), (17), (18) , and (20) with (22)- (26).
The results of the numerical simulations with these formulae are shown in FIGURE 3 in the next section.
D. SIMULATIONS FOR PREVIOUS AND PROPOSED QISK Y00
The numerical results are shown in FIGURE 3. The left column of the figure shows Eve's a posteriori probability derived from (13) and (22) in guessing Alice's signal parameters. The right column of the figure shows Eve's success probability derived from (19) and (25) . Results of implementation without OSK and the signal distance S = 200 photons are shown in FIGURE 3(a, b) , while the results of S = 500 photons without OSK are shown in FIGURE 3(c, d) . With OSK and S = 500 photons, the results are shown in FIGURE 3(e, f). FIGURE 3 shows that when S is small, the implementation without OSK is enough for suppressing Eve's success probability, as shown schematically in FIGURE 1 because Eve is less confident in her guess with a probability of 0.2 or less. However, when S becomes large, Eve is more confident in her guess with a probability of about 0.6 or less; hence, (9) and (19) with n E = S cen = 4 × 10 6 photons. Right column: Eve's success probability of altering a signal as she expected in (15) her success probability increases. However, even when S is large, Eve cannot succeed in signal falsification with a probability of approximately 1/3 when OSK is applied, as shown in FIGURE 2.
Thus, in the implementation proposed in this study, the use of OSK can suppress the probability of Eve succeeding in falsifying a one-byte message to (0.333) 8 , which is close to zero. By combining with conventional cryptography, the integrity of the message encoded by the quaternary Y00 protocol will be satisfied. For instance, Alice and Bob can detect message falsification by adding a hash value of the message, even MD5, because Eve must correctly alter not only the message but also the hash value.
Note that the method proposed in this paper is applicable to any type of Y00 system; not only ISK but also PSK and QAM.
E. COMMUNICATION DISTANCE VS. BIT-ERROR-RATE
Readers may wonder whether QISK protocol would satisfy the standard optical communication requirement that biterror-rate (BER) must be below 10 −9 . FIGURE 3 shows a BER vs. the distance, assuming the power loss of the optical link is 0.02 dB/km.
BER becomes more than 10 −9 around 130 km, the figure derived by the equations (27)- (30) is shown in Figure 4 , however, note that conventional optical amplifiers are available since S cen = 4 × 10 6 photons (1 mW of the laser power) is employed for ISK Y00 systems. Therefore, there are no limitations in communication distance in principle.
To derive BER, the following formulae are used. Consider a symbol-error-rate (SER) that Bob fails to obtain correct q {00, 01, 10, 11} from Alice because of quantum noise. Note that BER = SER on average since there are two cases of one-bit flipping in one symbol and one case of two-bit flipping; e.g., 00 turns into 01, 10, or 11 with a probability of SER. Thus, BER is roughly estimated by BER := (4M )
log 10 η := −0.02 × Distance.
VI. REMARKS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE WORKS
This section describes some advantages over conventional stream ciphers and one-time pad (OTP), then possible future works based on the quaternary Y00 protocol in this study.
A. ADVANTAGES OVER STREAM CIPHERS AND OTP
There are not many studies on full-KPA against conventional mathematical stream ciphers or OTP where full-plaintext is granted to Eve. In the previous work [28] , it was shown that a Y00 protocol would not allow Eve to launch a key-recovery attack by unlimitedly long KPA with a probability of unity under the certain attack scenario and implementation of the Y00 system even when Eve has a quantum memory and can perform the optimal measurement. Contrary, conventional mathematical stream ciphers allow Eve to recover the key with a probability of unity because the keystream will be explicitly known to Eve. Hence Eve can recover the key correctly no matter how much complex the keystream generation algorithms are.
OTP does not have a problem of a key recovery attack since the revealed key is supposed to be an (almost) perfect random string, and the string will be discarded once it is used. However, unlimitedly long KPA means Eve knows both the message and its hash value hidden under the OTP key. Therefore, Eve can alter the message perfectly, just by replacing them with her message and its hash value, encoding them with the revealed OTP key by KPA. To avoid this situation, a message authentication code (MAC) with a pre-shared key between Alice and Bob is required before they start communication based on OTP.
The one possible disadvantage of Y00 protocols is that their security has not been well-understood yet. Further theoretical analyses are required.
B. STUDY ON EVE'S OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGY
Sec. V.A described Eve's concrete strategy. However, there would be better attacks. For instance, the previous work [28] showed Eve would be more confident as time passes under her unlimitedly long KPA. Eve may keep passive eavesdropping until she becomes confident of the shared keys, then she launches her message falsification attacks based on her most possible keys.
Therefore, at least a security analysis of the message integrity must be given along the above strategy, and what kind of attack is optimal, or whether Eve's success probability can be upper-bounded under some assumptions.
Note also that [28] described that the legitimate users have to exchange a fresh key before the attacker's guessing probability rises at a certain level to threat the Y00 system. This key-refreshment will also prevent Eve from launching a message-falsification attack based on the most likely keys described above.
C. EXTENSION TO p-ary Y00 PROTOCOLS
A p-ary Y00 protocol (for example, p = 16 or 64) would be requested to realize faster communications since it can send log 2 p bit at one-time slot, while a binary Y00 protocol sends only one bit at a time.
If the previous straightforward LT in a similar manner in Sec. III.A, p! columns must be equipped in LT. Even if the approach in this study is employed, (p − 1)! columns are required.
Thus, it is preferable to replace LT with one formula. This is a challenging theme worth to study.
D. APPLICATION TO INITIAL-KEY AGREEMENT
There may be many potential applications of the technique proposed in this study. For instance, the following use is possible.
Consider that Alice is willing to communicate with Bob without any initially shared keys. To agree on a set of session keys, Alice sets her short session keys randomly to modulate her signals in the manner of (4), (7) , and (9) while her message being repeatedly sent is a fixed random string r of the length |r| bits. Bob chooses his short session keys independently to receive Alice's signals. He receives her r as r B = r while their keys are unmatched. Bob resends r B to Alice, and she receives it as r A = r. Alice continues changing her keys to perform brute force search while Bob's keys are fixed until they observe r A = r B = r. Once Alice observes r A = r, she tells Bob that the session keys are matched, then she sends a set of stronger keys to be shared. After the VOLUME 7, 2019 process, Alice and Bob exchange their IDs to confirm that Eve is not impersonating. Such a modification of challenge and response protocol [29] may help their key agreement.
To perform the above brute force search, the session keys must be short enough such as |k| + | k| = 32 bits if the individual can perform the search at 10 9 candidates/s to finish it within 5 seconds. Even if |k| = | k| = 16 bits, M = 1024 is realizable since log 2 M = 10 bits while the period of the keystream is 2 16 -1 at most. Therefore, they choose |r| = (2 16 -1)/(log 2 M ) < 6554 bits. After they confirm their IDs, Alice and Bob share longer keys, such as |k| + | k| = 256 or 512 bits.
The above scheme is an example of an application of the proposed method in this paper. However, its security analysis is not given in this study. Further security analyses or better protocols would be required. For instance, even though Eve would not know the random string r, Eve knows that the same r is repeatedly sent. It may give her some hint to attack the key agreement process, especially when Eve can alter r in the middle of the communication line when Y00 systems without message-falsification prevention are used. For example, Eve can replace IDs if the message falsification is possible, because IDs may be known to Eve.
The more serious problem is how Alice and Bob verify their IDs to avoid Eve's possible impersonation in the middle. To remove the possibility that Eve forges the IDs, their IDs may have to be certified by the third trusted party, called certification authorities (CAs) [29] .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, easier implementation of message-falsification prevention on the Y00 protocol is proposed by making it a quaternary Y00 protocol and reducing the necessary quantum-mask size to 4 using overlap-selection keying technique. The previous study gave the same function. However, it required covering 24 signal levels by the quantum-mask size. Thus, this implementation uses a quantum mask that is 1/6 the size of that in the previous work, and this smaller mask is sufficient to prevent the attacker's falsified messages.
Furthermore, in contrast to existing quantum cryptography protocols, it does not require quantum cryptography components, such as quantum digital signatures, to satisfy message integrity. Specifically, the quaternary Y00 protocol can use conventional mathematical cryptography to satisfy message integrity, hiding the conventional cryptography components in quantum noise. The numerical results showed that Eve could not successfully alter even a one-byte message at will. Hence, Alice and Bob can easily detect message alteration by adding a conventional message digest or a digital signature. Several directions of future works are also given; finding Eve's optimal attacks, rewriting the look-up table in one formula to extend the protocol to p-ary (p ≥ 4), finding further applications of the protocol such as a key agreement protocol.
